Monday, October 22, 2018
Berkeley's BOGO: Idealism and Theism
Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?
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Berkeley's argument that idealism leads to a proof of God is somewhat true, but it only gets him halfway to where he wants to be. If idealism is true, the only things that exist in the universe are not objects, but the collection of ideas that represent objects. As soon as I stop perceiving an ‘object’, that object does not cease to exist however, which would indicate that some other mind perceives that object. This proves that there must be some omnipresent perceiver that perceives objects at all times, since objects don’t pop in and out of existence. I obviously cannot be the origin of these collections of ideas, since when I perceive different objects I cannot change what I want to perceive with my mind. Berkeley concludes this must be the Christian God, but he falls short on a couple of fronts. First, Berkeley never proves that there is just one being perceiving all things. It is equally probable that each object has its own perceiver as it is likely that one perceiver perceives all objects. Given this, we can cast doubt on Berkeley’s proof of God’s existence since he never gives a reason to prefer the theory of one omnipresent perceiver as opposed to many always-present perceivers. This flies in the face of Christianity, since Christianity is clearly a monotheistic religion. Second, even if we are to say that there is only one God, Berkeley never proves a link between being an all-knowing observer and omnipotence. It is entirely possible to perceive all objects in the world and simultaneously not have control over any of those objects. To make a simple analogy on the individual scale, when I perceive something I do not have absolute control over it. I cannot change if I perceive an object to be hot or cold, so clearly perception does not have to do with power. Since the same holds true when I perceive multiple objects, this observation that there is no inherent link between perceiving an object and having power over it clearly scales upwards. Thus, given that Berkeley never gives a reason why scaling this idea further into the infinite would suddenly change anything, it is entirely possible that the omnipresent being Berkeley talks about could be a perceiver of little power—unlike the Christian God. Third, even if we were to say that there is only one omnipresent being who created all ideas in the world, Berkeley never proves that this being would be the Christian God. This being could be the God of other monotheistic religions that Berkeley probably rejects, such as Deism or Islam, or an entirely different set of beliefs called Harveyism. Just because there is an all-powerful God doesn’t mean that this all powerful God corresponds with my preconceived ideas of it, as opposed to another person’s preconceived ideas of it. Berkeley never disproves Harveyism, and thus his argument could lead to heathens concluding Harveyism is equally as true as Christianity. It is for these three reasons that Berkeley’s argument falls short of proving the Christian God.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. However, his argument is at best valid and unsound. Berkeley draws his conclusion for the existence of God from two premises: 1. If idealism is true, then God must exist, and 2. Idealism is true. Berkeley does not appear to state the first premise explicitly, but he makes an explicit argument for the second premise. Berkeley argues that we only know the existence of things through our perceptions of them. Indeed, the existence of things seems to depend on something perceiving them, since there is nothing existing that is not some how perceived as existing. Thus, to be is to be perceived, that is, idealism is true. If it is true that if idealism is true then god must exist, and idealism is true, then it follows that God must exist. Therefore, Berkeley's argument is valid. However, it is not sound because both premises are objectionable. Berkeley implies that the first premise is true, but he provides no justification for it. Even if the first premise is true, it would merely show that every perception of a thing has a perceiver, not that there is a single, perfect perceiver of all things. The second premise is also unsupported, because it does not follow from the fact that we only know the existence of things through our perceptions that those things depend on perceptions to exist. Thus, his argument is unsound. At the most, it shows that if idealism is true, then there must be a perceiver for every perception, not that there must be a single perfect perceiver, God, for all perceptions.
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